GNSS and DGNSS spoofing detection

E Ochin

Аннотация


One of the main problems of modern navigation both manned and unmanned transport systems is a problem of transport safety. To improve the accuracy of transport positioning used Differential GNSS technology, which is based on setting a fixed referent station with a known position XYZ. Unfortunately, GNSS is vulnerable to malicious intrusion with the help of cyber-attacks as jamming and Spoofing. GNSS signals and/or correction signals of DGNSS referent station can be jammed and/or spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. How can the rover receiver (i. e., the user) be sure that the information they receive is authentic? Spoofing is the transmission of matched-GNSS-signal-structure and/or signals of referent station interference in an attempt to commandeer the tracking loops of a victim receiver and thereby manipulate the receiver’s timing or navigation solution. A spoofer can transmit its counterfeit signals from a stand-off distance of several hundred meters, or it can be co-located with its victim. In this article we consider the principles of spoofing detection using mainly Differential GNSS, in which a correction signals of referent station uses for detection of spoofing.

Ключевые слова


GNSS; DGNSS; differential station; reference station; radio beacon; antiterrorism; antispoofing

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Литература


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DOI: 10.15826/urej.2017.1.1.003


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